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**SIZING UP THE ADVERSARY: LEADER ATTRIBUTES, CREDIBILITY,
AND RECIPROCATION IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT**

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SIZING UP THE ADVERSARY: LEADER ATTRIBUTES, CREDIBILITY, AND RECIPROCATION IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

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Abstract

Leaders negotiate, not states, yet the extensive body of work on credibility in international interactions focuses almost exclusively on regime type. In this paper we argue that when sizing up the credibility of a threat, leaders draw cues from the experiential and physical attributes of their adversary as well as the political institutions of the country they govern. Specifically, we assess military experience, age, gender, and paths to power – attributes that are directly related to risk acceptance and attitudes toward the use of force. Because these attributes bear a relationship with the propensity of leaders to bluff or initiate disputes and are transparent to their adversaries, they become powerful heuristics that provide insight into credibility. Drawing on new data on leader attributes, we provide evidence of this influence in the context of both dispute and compellent threat reciprocation.

How credible are the cues sent by world leaders? When Kim Jong Un threatens a nuclear attack on South Korea and nearby U.S. military bases if his country's enemies "make even the slightest movement," should we believe him? How accurately do world leaders interpret the signals sent by others?

The underlying question of the extent to which leaders can effectively send and interpret credible signals is critical to international relations. Research by Fearon (1994), Schultz (1998), and others suggests that the ability of states to make credible commitments – to war, peace, or diplomacy – is essential to success in international

crisis situations. The majority of this work addresses the extent to which the credibility of a leader's commitments is influenced by "audience costs" that they would be forced to pay if they were to back down. In this light, the threats made by democratic leaders are generally seen as more credible than those made by dictators, because the threat of punishment at the ballot box would make it harder for a democratic leader to renege on his commitment. Recent work, however, has questioned both the theoretical and empirical validity of this claim, with some scholars (e.g. Downes and Sechser 2012; Snyder and Borghard 2011; Trachtenberg 2012) challenging the very existence of audience costs and of course, by extension, their power as a source of credibility.

We argue here that one important source of variability in credibility – one which seems to have escaped close scholarly scrutiny – is the personal characteristics of the actual leaders who sit at the bargaining table. Attributes that are systematically associated with risk tolerance, bluffing, or attitudes toward the use of force can (if they are directly observable or otherwise knowable) serve as powerful heuristics for those attempting to judge the credibility of that leader's threats or actions.¹ The essential insight is that leader attributes that are systematically associated with patterns of past behavior become invaluable indicators of future behavior. While this logic is novel in the academic literature, it is well understood by leaders and those who advise them. It is, for example, one reason why the Central Intelligence Agency in the United States has

¹ The idea that personal attributes inform judgments of credibility is also in keeping with research on bargaining processes in other contexts, which has tended to focus on the discernable attributes of the participants be it age, gender, or race (e.g. Ayres 1991).

prepared background dossiers on foreign leaders for generations, and why presidents rely on them as critical resources during times of conflict.

In fact, rich anecdotal evidence from dozens of well-documented bargaining situations makes it clear that world leaders are not only knowledgeable about the attributes and experiences of their adversaries, but that they draw important inferences from this information. In the 1961 Berlin Crisis, for example, Khrushchev, noting Kennedy's relative youthfulness and inexperience, referred to him as "a boy in short pants (Smyser 2009)." Khrushchev assumed that Kennedy lacked resolve due to his youth and naiveté, a perception that carried over to the early phases of the Cuban Missile Crisis. In contrast, Khrushchev was deeply alarmed by Mao's threats during the second Taiwan crisis, in part because Mao's background as a revolutionary leader made Khrushchev believe he would be ready and willing to take dangerous risks. Decades later, Milošević extrapolated from Clinton's lack of military and combat experience that he would not follow through on his threats regarding the Kosovo conflict. In contrast, both allies and adversaries took Eisenhower at his word during the 1956 Suez crisis and explicitly referenced his background as the allied commander in World War II as a reason for this judgment. In short, for countries and leaders trying to predict the way a potential or current adversary might behave, cognitive shortcuts based on the personal attributes of their adversary can be valuable.

In preparing this paper, we use the new Leader Experience and Attribute Descriptions (LEAD) dataset, which covers heads of state from 1875 to 2001 – everyone from Rutherford B. Hayes to Adolf Hitler to Hugo Chavez. Along with the length and

dates of their tenure and paths to power, drawn from Archigos, LEAD contains data on the age, gender, rebel backgrounds, and military service of each head of state. We focus on these attributes because they are either directly observable or widely known to adversaries and generate clear theoretical expectations about risk-tolerance, attitudes toward the use of force, and credibility. With these data in hand, we assess whether or not these attributes contribute to or detract from the perceived bargaining credibility of leaders. In this sense, we build directly on Horowitz and Stam (forthcoming) who assess the relationship between leader attributes and dispute initiation. This article extends that logic by assessing the implications for how leaders perceive one another in conflict situations.

We begin our analysis with military experience and paths to power because these background experiences figure most prominently in official assessments such as the aforementioned CIA leader dossiers. They are also clearly relevant to leaders when they assess adversaries since these attributes are mentioned frequently in public statements as well as internal deliberations that become public years later.

Military and combat experiences are the prior life attributes most directly applicable to the core relationship between credibility and conflict escalation. Military service, for example, is reasonably transparent and bears direct relation to the threat of military action; as such, it is likely to influence how an adversary views a leader's propensity to follow through on threats and escalate disputes when threatened. We break prior military experience into two distinct categories: whether a leader

experienced combat as part of a regular military and whether a leader's primary career before entering office was in the military.

We theorize that leaders with prior combat experience tend to be more cautious with the use of force and less inclined to use the threat of it to bluff strategically. Those with military careers, in contrast, are led by their familiarity with the institution to use the military as a general tool. Since these forces move in the opposite directions, but overlap substantially, our primary interest is in the interaction between them. We find support for our expectation that prior combat experience tends to increase credibility, making adversaries more likely to back down, while those with a career background in the military (especially when they lack combat experience) are significantly more likely to have their disputes reciprocated.

Pathways to power also shape how a leader's behavior is perceived. In this analysis we concern ourselves with rebel legacies and irregular entry into office such as through coups because leaders with these background experiences may be (or may be perceived to be) more risk-acceptant than those without them. Taking up arms against a government is treasonous and potentially deadly, and therefore might signal a willingness to gamble on the use of force. Those who assume power under these circumstances are generally the leaders of rebel movements – not foot soldiers coerced into participation. Moreover, in principle, such backgrounds indicate some level of comfort with the use of force as a coercive tool.

Among personal attributes, we consider the roles of age and gender. We find that women leaders tend to be deemed more credible than men, and older leaders are generally more credible than their younger counterparts.

Our theory and results add nuance to ongoing discussions about the origins of credibility in international interactions. In many ways the audience cost argument carries the legacy of the problem that it was first employed to solve – understanding observed empirical differences in conflict behavior between democracies and autocracies (Schultz 2012). Focusing attention exclusively on institutions tends to obscure the reality that conflict decisions are made by people, and that these people weigh the options available to them based on what they know about life, risk, and each other. That said, the argument we make here supplements rather than displaces existing work on democratic institutions and credibility. Our findings are orthogonal to the audience cost argument; we identify an entirely different mechanism through which credibility might be generated or diminished.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. We begin by situating our argument in the extant literature on credibility and developing theoretical expectations regarding relationships between particular leader background attributes and credibility in international conflict. We test these expectations in models of dispute reciprocation and response to compelling threats (Downes and Sechser 2012). We close by discussing the implication of these findings for policymakers as well as future research in international relations.

The Origins of Personal Credibility

When the leader of a country receives a militarized challenge – a threatened airstrike, direct attack, or border incursion – she must quickly judge its credibility, and one rich source of such information is the personal attributes and experiences of the executive “across the negotiating table.” National leaders have a great deal of personal discretion over the actions of the countries they represent, and their personal biases therefore potentially matter a great deal. Whether their nation is an autocracy or democracy, leaders formulate and articulate national policy, especially in regards to important events in foreign affairs such as militarized disputes. Most importantly, heads of state typically have significant autonomy over foreign policy, particularly in the context of crises. This autonomy stems, in part, from informational asymmetries that favor the executive early in conflicts (Potter and Baum 2010).²

There are certainly well publicized instances in which leaders have made significant judgments about the likely behavior of other countries based in large part on their personal perceptions of the other side’s leaders. Recall American President George W. Bush saying of Russian President Vladimir Putin, “I looked the man in the eye. I found him to be very straight forward and trustworthy.”³ While Bush’s strategy for assessing Putin’s credibility would be challenging to operationalize, there are more systematically observable leader attributes that signal reputation to adversaries. Indeed,

² In the United States, for example, the President is widely thought to have significantly more leeway in foreign policy than domestic policy, especially when it comes to international crises and the use of force.

³ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/1392791.stm>.

findings from experimental psychology consistently demonstrate that individuals make judgments about credibility and trustworthiness based in large part on personal attributes (Rau 2012) (Lev-Ari and Keysar 2010) (Stanley et al. 2011; Petrican et al. 2012).

Judgments about the credibility of a threat based on personal attributes are the result of two separate but related processes: the underlying propensity of the challenger to bluff, and the extent to which this propensity is transparent to the party receiving the threat. Any insight into whether an adversary is a bluffing “type” or a credible “type” can inform judgments about whether these are determined threats or merely inflated rhetoric aimed at winning a concession. In short, the actual magnitude of a leader’s determination to act is only one small part of the equation; it’s the target’s beliefs about this determination that matter. Schultz (1998) and Fearon (1994) are both quite explicit about the role of perception. Both point out, for example, that autocracies actually have high audience costs, but since those costs are relatively invisible to outsiders, they have a lower effect on the perceived credibility of an autocratic leader’s threats.

The implication is that the actual propensity to bluff and the perceived propensity to bluff act in concert. Characteristics that are associated with risk-acceptant leaders can become heuristics that adversaries use to interpret strength of resolve. In contrast, characteristics of risk-averse leaders can come to imply that they are less likely to bluff; in the rare instances when risk-averse leaders do make a threat, it will likely be perceived as credible.

The Importance of Leader Attributes and Experiences

One of the most direct ways that leaders might assess the credibility of their counterparts is on the basis of their background experiences before entering office. Research by Goldgeier (1994), Jervis (1976), Horowitz and Stam (2013), Kennedy (2011), Saunders (2011) and others suggests that prior experiences play a critical role in shaping the beliefs and behavior of leaders once they enter office. These experiences shape the way leaders evaluate the costs and benefits of their actions, as well as the types of actions they are likely to see as risky or dangerous. As always, external perception is equally important. Prior experiences have the advantage of being relatively transparent, especially for heads of state, making them something that adversaries are likely to weigh when they consider a leader's credibility. In this section, we identify three classes of leader attributes and background experiences and explore how they may influence the probability of dispute reciprocation: prior military experience, paths to power, and personal attributes. This is not meant to be an exhaustive accounting, but rather a probe into the most likely mechanisms through which leaders themselves may actually influence national credibility in dispute bargaining situations.

Military Experience

Military service is a particularly salient background characteristic when considering the potential for escalation since it involves an experience linked to the ultimate escalation of a militarized dispute or threat – a war. Since military service often occurs in late adolescence and early adulthood, it also plays a vital role in shaping future beliefs

about the world (Roberts et al. 2003). Rather than considering military service as a binary, the extant literature indicates the need to break down military service into constituent parts that can help disentangle the way different types of prior military experience may lead to different expectations about behavior and outcomes in militarized disputes.

After World War II, Huntington (1957) and Janowitz (1960), suggested that those with combat experience were among the most hesitant when it came to the initial use of force.⁴ Having experienced the risk of death themselves, they remained acutely aware of the meaning and implications of battle. More recently, micro-level survey research by Brunk et al. (1990) shows that combat veterans were far less likely than control groups to believe that the use of force was justified. Feaver and Gelpi (2004) argue that veterans in Congress are less likely than their counterparts to support military action. Horowitz and Stam (2012) find that leaders with prior combat experience are no more likely to initiate militarized disputes than those without.⁵

Once a combat veteran decides that the use of force is legitimate, however, he is much more likely to favor escalation (Brunk et al. 1990; Gelpi and Feaver 2004) External perception tends to follow this logic. Those with combat experience are more likely to be perceived as having greater expertise and knowledge when it comes to the use of military force. Andrew Kennedy's (2011) research on efficacy beliefs suggests that prior experience could make combat veterans who become leaders more familiar with the use

⁵ Combat experience as a rebel could, in theory, have similar effects. However, as described in the research design section, we lack some of the data necessary to test this argument. It is an interesting path for future research, however.

of force and more likely to see themselves as effective at utilizing force when the time comes.

The implication is that those with prior combat experience who become heads of state should seem particularly credible when they initiate militarized disputes. They are not, on average, more prone to initiating them in general, meaning their militarized initiations are not perceived as exceptionally risk acceptant. They are also likely to receive credit for their expertise based on their past experience – or at least perceived expertise. Thus, those responding to militarized dispute initiations by leaders with prior combat experience are more likely to think that the leader is fully committed, likely to escalate, and that it is a matter of national importance. All other things being equal, this should make the target less likely to reciprocate and escalate the dispute. This insight informs our first hypothesis:

H1: Leaders with prior combat experience will have the militarized disputes they initiate reciprocated less often than those without combat experience.

While one might assume that the effect of career military service should have a similar effect to combat experience, there are important distinctions with implications for our theory. In particular, those who have made the military a career should be leaders more likely to absorb the biases in favor of militarism that Sechser (2004) cites. These biases include a propensity in favor of offensive action, the overall willingness to see the use of military force as a positive good, and a sense of knowledge and expertise when it comes to the use of the military.

However, the extent to which these biases characterize future beliefs might be influenced by whether or not a leader experiences combat. Prior research by Horowitz and Stam (forthcoming) suggests that leaders with prior military experience but no combat experience, such as George W. Bush, are among those most likely to initiate disputes. Their military experiences give them confidence in their ability to utilize military force and make them more likely to see the use of force as the solution to a larger category of international confrontations. However, these leaders lack the corresponding exposure to the gruesome realities of battle that leads to more conservatism when it comes to the initiation of militarized disputes. Therefore, those that have served entire military careers but have not experienced combat may be particularly dispute and threat prone, but less committed to those they initiate.

If these leaders are perceived as especially risk prone and likely to initiate conflicts and make threats that they are not necessarily committed to, they will not be particularly credible. Moreover, while distinct from the question of credibility, military careerists without battlefield experience may threaten military action so often that adversaries contemplating Axelrod's (1984) "shadow of the future" may choose to return the threat to avoid being bullied. Our second hypothesis, then, is:

Hypothesis 2: Leaders with military careers will have their militarized dispute initiations reciprocated more often than those without career military experience.

In order to pull apart our proposed divergent effects of a military career and combat it is necessary to consider the conditional relationship between these experiences. We

argue that among leaders who are career military officers there will be observable differences between those with combat experience and those without. Those without combat experience are likely to be highly militaristic and prone to bluffing – Qaddafi is a prototypical example of this type. On the other hand, military careerists who have seen war first hand, Eisenhower for example, will tend to be more judicious and credible. This leads to our third hypothesis.

Hypothesis 3: Leaders with career military experience and combat experience will have their militarized dispute initiations reciprocated less often than those without these attributes.

Legacy of Power

Many prominent national leaders in the 20th century, from Mao to Ben Gurion, were rebels before becoming heads of state. Arguably, those that select into rebellion are likely more risk-acceptant than those who do not. Taking up arms against a national government is often a losing endeavor with potentially dire consequences, but the payoffs can be worth the risk, particularly for those who serve in leadership positions in the rebellion.

Rebels who become leaders are also more likely to develop efficacy beliefs that favor the use of force. Efficacy beliefs are positive views about one's abilities and when those abilities are likely to lead to success. One clear source of efficacy beliefs is life experience (Kennedy 2010; Jervis 1976). Experience as a successful rebel will socialize future leaders to believe that the types of aggressive behaviors that might be risky for someone else are not, in fact, risky for them. Those who enter office through violent

means, such as a coup or revolution, have taken the ultimate risk in rebelling against their national government to seize power and have acquired high levels of martial efficacy during the process⁶. This not only suggests higher levels of *ex ante* risk acceptance, but greater confidence in their ability to use force to achieve their goals. Horowitz and Stam's (forthcoming) findings confirm this theoretical intuition, showing that leaders with former rebel experience are significantly more likely to initiate militarized disputes than their counterparts without rebel experience.

Former rebels are also likely to be deemed more conflict-prone by their opponents. These rebels have, by definition, overthrown the status quo and disrupted the international order. Especially given that many former rebels come to power due to their rebellious activity (though some, particularly second generation leaders such as Deng Xiaoping, do not), more established states might fear further pressure from former rebels might be particularly disruptive to the system and evidence of long term revisionism. However, if there is a higher likelihood that former rebels will initiate militarized disputes, it means that these leaders are likely to be less careful in their selection of adversaries than other leaders and also less committed. Taken together, the risk-acceptant nature of prior rebels as well as their liberal resort to militarized threats and actions means that they will disproportionately initiate conflict in more marginal circumstances and that, in time, this bias will coalesce into a reputation for bluffing among this class of leader.

⁶ The theoretical mechanism for this is described by Kennedy (2010) and drawn out further by Horowitz and Stam (2013). Also see Goldgeier (1994).

What does this mean for their adversaries? Actors responding to a dispute initiated by a former rebel should be less likely to have confidence that the initiating regime has accurately weighed the risks and rewards of conflict. If they question the care with which the threat or conflict initiation was made then states facing a militarized initiation by a former rebel will be more likely to reciprocate militarized challenges. This leads us to our fourth hypothesis:

H4: Leaders with prior rebel experience will have the militarized disputes they initiate reciprocated more often than those without rebel experience.

Much the same logic holds for leaders who obtain office through irregular means such as coups. Again, these power grabs such as these are risky and prone to failure, but when these coups succeed and a leader acquires public office, he will have a strong sense of the value and potential success of force. As with former rebels, this biases toward military action and threats without proper consideration of the resolve and capability of opponents or the potential costs. Thus, leaders with this legacy are more likely to be seen as risk-acceptant, but they will also do a poor job with adversary selection. These insights inform our fifth hypothesis:

H5: Leaders who obtain office through irregular means will have the militarized disputes they initiate reciprocated more often than those who obtain office through regular means.

Personal Attributes

Conventional wisdom and the media tend to hold that younger leaders are brash and

foolhardy, while older leaders tend toward caution and judiciousness. Descriptions of the younger Bill Clinton as “dashing” versus the older George H.W. Bush as “experienced” in the 1992 U.S. presidential campaign, as well as the way the media played up the so-called generation gap between them, illustrate the way in which the importance of age has filtered into the popular consciousness. Horowitz, McDermott and Stam (2007) argue that age acts on risk propensity by influencing testosterone levels, and through it, aggressiveness, as well as by changing time horizons. They find that in most types of domestic political regimes, in contrast to what one might expect based on testosterone levels, it is actually older leaders, rather than younger leaders, that are more likely to initiate disputes.

What should this mean for dispute reciprocation? One possibility is that older leaders, due to their experience and knowledge, are more judicious in the conflicts and threats they initiate, making these threats and conflicts more credible when they do occur. Alternatively, it could be that younger leaders, even though they are not more likely to initiate disputes in general (except in personalist regimes, where they are significantly more likely), lack good judgment in selecting adversaries for the disputes they do initiate (Horowitz and Stam, Forthcoming). This should make reciprocation more likely for disputes initiated by younger leaders and less likely for disputes initiated by older leaders. This leads us to our sixth hypothesis:

H6: Older leaders will have the disputes they initiate reciprocated less often than their younger counterparts.

Finally, we turn to the role that gender may play in influencing responses to militarized challenges.⁷ Scholarly work in economics and finance has concluded that women are more risk-averse, more credible, and less inclined to bluff than men (Croson and Gneezy 2009). Johnson et al. (2006) explore these tendencies and the role of overconfidence in experimental war games, reporting that overconfidence and attacks are much more pronounced among males than females. In theory, this would suggest that women are more risk adverse than their male counterparts, so their disputes, on average, should be less likely to be reciprocated.

It is of course possible that the females most likely to become heads of states are those that fit typical leader stereotypes rather than gender stereotypes. If this were the case, we would not expect gender to play a role at all.⁸ That said, the processes described by Johnson et al. (2006) and others arise from deeply seeded biological and psychological processes and are therefore likely to extend even to this very distinctive population. This leads us to our final hypothesis:

H7: Female leaders will have the disputes they initiate reciprocated less often than their male counterparts.

Research Design

⁷ While, the small number of female heads of state raises the question of whether lessons can be drawn at all, there are ten cases available for analysis in our data. These are threats issued by Golda Meier, Indira Gandhi, Margaret Thatcher, Isabella Peron, Tansu Ciller, Gro Harlem Brundtlan, Benazir Bhutto, Kim Campbell, Violeta Chamorro, and Helen Clark.

⁸ It is also worth noting that the usual differences between males and females might not hold up in the expected ways in the types of environments we see in international politics, e.g. cases of provocation (Bettencourt and Miller 1996). Still, because perception (whether right or wrong) is such a powerful force in military response, we propose that female leaders will be deemed more risk-averse, and therefore more credible, than their male counterparts.

The very nature of credibility makes it difficult to detect because indirect tests for its presence are subject to sample selection bias. Leaders who successfully generate credibility do not incur costs because they succeed (Schultz 2001), leading to potential bias stemming from partial observability. The solution that Schultz and others who have followed (e.g. Weeks 2008) employ in their work on audience costs is to explore the reciprocation of militarized interstate disputes as a second order implication of credibility. The logic is that the decision to reciprocate a dispute is an indication of the extent to which the threatened state finds the initiator credible. In the audience costs literature, for example, all else equal, states that are able to generate audience costs should be deemed more credible and should therefore face less reciprocation (Smith 1998; Schultz 1998).

We begin our analysis by exploiting this logic, even though we are exploring a different causal pathway. The idea is that leaders with attributes associated with credibility in the eyes of their adversaries should, all else equal, have fewer of their disputes reciprocated than do leaders with less credibility. Those leaders without the attributes associated with credibility will be perceived as bluffing and therefore as easier marks for the reciprocating state. Thus, in our models, the unit of analysis is the militarized interstate dispute and the dependent variable is a dichotomous indicator of whether the initiator's challenge is reciprocated (1 if the militarized dispute initiation is reciprocated and 0 otherwise). Our core models assess the period from 1869-2001, though we also assess a shortened 1945-2001 time series to facilitate comparison with existing work in this area.

Still, recent work has called into question the usefulness of dispute reciprocation as a measure of credibility (Downes and Sechser 2012), arguing that the vast majority of militarized interstate disputes contain no explicit compellent threat. This is a valid concern, and to address it we conduct two additional tests. First, we test our theory on a compellent threat dataset later in the paper (Sechser 2011). If the mechanisms we identify here are valid, they should still be observable when leaders issue compellent threats. Second, in the Appendix, we show that the results are consistent if we switch to violent reciprocation of MIDs instead of just MID reciprocation.

That said, we believe that relying on dispute reciprocation in general is still a useful domain in which to test our hypotheses for three reasons. Much of this relates to the specific hypotheses we seek to test here, compared to the audience costs literature. First, explicit threats are only one of the ways that states attempt to leverage each other in international politics. There are others as well, such as troop movements and deployments. Additionally, a substantial number of the threats in the international system are implicit. For example, when U.S. President Truman deployed B-29s to Guam in 1947 during the Berlin Airlift, the B-29s were designed to show the Soviet Union that the United States was taking the issue seriously and would not back down. However, the B-29 deployment was not accompanied by a public threat against the Soviet Union. That does not make it less of a militarized challenge – just a challenge of a different stripe than one accompanied by a compellent threat. Second, only focusing on compellent threats excludes deterrence-based activities, or troop movements, deployments, and threats designed to preserve the status quo rather than change the

status quo. There is no reason, *a priori*, to ignore deterrent threats in a broader study of when militarized challenges are likely to escalate in general. Third, the noise that Downes and Sechser identify in the MIDs dataset is real, but there is no reason to think it biases the data in favor of our findings. If anything, given the specificity of our argument, the addition of that noise should make identifying a clear relationship more difficult, biasing against our theory.

We test our hypotheses with independent variables drawn from Horowitz and Stam's Leader Experience and Attribute Descriptions (LEAD) dataset. The LEAD dataset adds information on leader background characteristics to the universe of leaders covered by the Archigos dataset developed by Chiozza, Goemans, and Gleditsch (2009). *Gender* is coded 1 if the leader is female, and 0 if male. *Age* is simply the leader's age in years at the time of the event.⁹ *Rebel* is coded a 1 if the leader previously participated in armed rebellion against the government of a nation-state, and 0 otherwise. This definition is broad, since it encompasses those who foment coups as well as those engaged in long-term guerilla warfare, but it captures the risk propensity and efficacy beliefs that are of interest since all involve dangerous military activities conducted against a national government. *Irregular* is coded 1 if the leader obtains office through non-institutionalized means such as a coup or revolution, and 0 otherwise.¹⁰ *Military Career* is 1 if the primary occupation of the leader prior to entering

⁹ Among the personal attribute variables we take special care to avoid variables that are potentially post-treatment. Post-treatment variables are those that are potentially effects of the independent variables of interest. We take care here to pick variables that are pre-treatment or at least uncorrelated with our independent variables of interest.

¹⁰ This variable does not entirely overlap with the rebel variable in part because some revolutionaries do not immediately take office, for example Deng Xiaoping. It is unlikely that

office was serving in the military, and 0 otherwise. It is not necessary for the military to be the immediate prior occupation of the leader (Eisenhower, for example, was President of Columbia University between his service in the military and the executive office), just for the primary occupation of the leader to be a military career.¹¹ *Combat* is 1 if the leader participated in combat as a member of a uniformed military, and 0 otherwise. Exposure to combat in this context counts as being engaged in military tasks in an active war zone.¹² While it would be optimal to have a variable that could differentiate down to the level of whether or not a leader actually fired a weapon or was fired upon, the mechanism that leads to more conservatism on the part of those with prior combat experience is exposure to the fear of death. Deploying to an active combat zone is still fairly granular from a data perspective and is likely to trigger those perceptions.¹³

Given the prominence of regime type in explanations of national credibility, we include a *Democracy* variable (1 if the initiating state is a democracy and 0 otherwise), which we derive from the Polity IV data. Following Schultz (2001), we control for the power dynamic within the initiator/potential reciprocator dyad and whether those states are contiguous, whether they are allies, and the degree of similarity in their

leaders are ever selected specifically on the basis of their propensity to reciprocate MIDs. It is, however possible that specific moments in history favor leaders who are strong on foreign policy, or that certain political arrangements might favor those who are willing to appeal to nationalistic sentiments with aggression abroad.

¹¹ Data for this also drawn from Besley and Reynol-Querol (2011).

¹² For more on issues involved in coding prior combat experience, see Horowitz and Stam (forthcoming).

¹³ Additionally, that stricter definition would make it extremely difficult to code leaders who served in the Navy or Air Force of their respective countries, even though a pilot or someone serving on a naval vessel at war also experiences the risk of death..

alliance portfolios. Finally, the stakes under dispute may matter a lot in how states respond to militarized challenges. Countries are much more likely to stand strong, for example, on territorial issues than on matters of minor policy. Therefore, following prior research, we include several measures of the nature of the initiator's challenge: territory, government, policy, or other. Each is 1 if the condition is active for the particular dispute in question, and 0 otherwise.

Results

To ensure comparability with prior research, we base our initial models on Schultz (2001). All models are conditional logit equations on the dichotomous measure of dispute reciprocation. We rely on initiator country fixed effects to account for unmodeled country-level attributes, helping us isolate the relative effect of leader qualities. Models 1 and 2 add our key variables of interest to an updated version of Schultz's (2001) models of dispute reciprocation, looking at the entire time period, 1869-2001 (Model 1), as well as 1945-2001 (Model 2). Models 3 and 4 add an interaction between combat experience and our military career variable so that we can more explicitly test hypothesis 3.

Before describing the multivariate results, it is worth noting that even very simple bivariate analyses of the relationship between key leadership attributes and reciprocation reveal interesting patterns – age, rebel experience, career military experience, and the interaction between career service and combat are all statistically significant and signed in the hypothesized direction. That said, the statistical controls

that we have described are necessary in that they are likely correlated with both our dependent and explanatory variables, and excluding them therefore runs the risk of omitted variable bias. In response to this concern, we turn now to consider the multivariate analyses (Table 1)

Table 1 – Leadership Attributes and Dispute Reciprocation

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	1869-2001	1945-2001	1869-2001	1945-2001
	β /(SE)	β /(SE)	β /(SE)	β /(SE)
Combat*Career			-0.717*	-0.756+
			(0.347)	(0.395)
Combat	-0.244+	-0.279	-0.105	-0.070
	(0.141)	(0.192)	(0.163)	(0.233)
Career	0.461*	0.739**	0.946***	1.158**
	(0.179)	(0.248)	(0.247)	(0.378)
Rebel	0.243+	0.265	0.257	0.299
	(0.145)	(0.208)	(0.172)	(0.270)
Irregular	0.225	0.114	0.249	0.158
	(0.161)	(0.200)	(0.182)	(0.247)
Age	-0.014**	-0.013+	-0.014*	-0.014+
	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.008)
Gender	-1.002*	-1.264*	-0.980*	-1.223**
	(0.478)	(0.502)	(0.486)	(0.419)
Democracy	0.114	0.672*	0.098	0.665+
	(0.220)	(0.328)	(0.226)	(0.362)
Major/Major	0.388	12.729	0.361	12.696***
	(0.382)	(469.557)	(0.346)	(1.247)
Minor/Major	-0.170	0.245	-0.162	0.233
	(0.228)	(0.305)	(0.294)	(0.375)
Major/Minor	0.352	13.075	0.308	13.026***
	(0.336)	(469.557)	(0.465)	(1.257)
Capability	0.169	0.360	0.186	0.382
	(0.263)	(0.357)	(0.330)	(0.505)
Contiguity	0.882***	0.771***	0.879***	0.743**
	(0.130)	(0.180)	(0.194)	(0.243)
Alliance	0.086	-0.172	0.072	-0.173
	(0.147)	(0.211)	(0.155)	(0.215)
Alliance Portfolio Similarity	-0.083	0.151	-0.074	0.151
	(0.216)	(0.301)	(0.389)	(0.394)
Status Quo Evaluation Initiator	-0.009	-0.263	0.016	-0.220
	(0.326)	(0.624)	(0.450)	(0.573)
Status Quo Evaluation Target	0.290	0.388	0.282	0.359
	(0.262)	(0.356)	(0.307)	(0.332)
Territory	0.520***	0.313	0.501***	0.299+
	(0.144)	(0.195)	(0.131)	(0.171)
Government	0.234	-0.336	0.237	-0.344
	(0.253)	(0.323)	(0.275)	(0.257)
Policy	-1.063***	-1.373***	-1.089***	-1.403***
	(0.125)	(0.163)	(0.110)	(0.139)
Other	-0.904**	-1.445***	-0.940**	-1.464**
	(0.320)	(0.396)	(0.316)	(0.479)
N	2370	1478	2370	1478

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$


The results from Table 1 provide support for some, but not all, of our hypotheses. Models 1-4 demonstrate the crucial role that prior military experience plays in shaping the way militarized dispute initiations are received by adversaries. As predicted, those with military careers are more likely to see their disputes reciprocated. Arguably, these leaders have been most clearly socialized into thinking about the use of military force as appropriate in a wide variety of situations, making them less selective when initiating militarized disputes. Thus, they select more marginal conflicts and more resolved adversaries, increasing the probability of dispute reciprocation.

In contrast, those with prior combat experience are somewhat less likely to see their disputes reciprocated (though the result is only significant in Model 1). It is possible that prior combat experience makes leaders especially careful about selecting adversaries who are less likely to back down. It is also possible that their reputation for competence makes others perceive them as more credible, given that dispute reciprocation becomes significantly less likely when the head of state had prior combat experience. Especially given the fact that those with prior combat experience are not significantly more likely to initiate militarized disputes (Horowitz and Stam, forthcoming), it likely makes those initiations, when they occur, more credible.

The more telling tests, however, come in the context of our conditional hypothesis. Models 3 and 4 show a negative and significant relationship between military career and combat experience, as well as a positive, significant coefficient for career experience absent the conditional relationship. Figure 1 below (derived from

Table 1, Model 3) shows how the predicted probability of reciprocation varies across conditions.

Figure 1 – Probability of Reciprocation for Career Conditional on Combat Experience



The primary takeaway from Figure 1 is the significant difference between those with military careers that have seen combat and those that have not. Leaders with military careers, but not combat experience, see approximately 62% of the disputes they initiate reciprocated, while those with military careers and combat experience enjoy a rate of just 46%, a statistically significant difference. One leader typical of this pattern is Qaddafi who was an officer, but saw no actual fighting. He initiated 19 disputes and


had nearly 70% of them reciprocated. This stands in contrast to the entire sample in which only 45% of dispute initiations were reciprocated. This difference is statistically significant ($p < 0.05$) in a two-sample t test with equal variances.

Notably, there are just 21 leaders in our dataset that spent all or nearly all of their careers in the military prior to assuming office as the head of state, but did not experience combat. This list, however, includes some impressively unsavory characters: Al-Assad H. (20 MIDs), Al-Bashir (6 MIDs), Hugo Chavez (3 MIDs), Mobutu (18 MIDs), Noriega (2 MIDs), Qaddafi (19 MIDs), Siad Barre (7 MIDs), and Tudjman (4 MIDs).

In contrast, there are null findings for the variables that address leaders' paths to power (*Rebel* and *Irregular*). This result could stem from a variety of sources. It may be that these experiences are insufficiently transparent to opposing leaders or are sufficiently far in the past that they do not figure prominently in leader assessments. It is also possible that all these experiences are not created equal and, in fact, cut in opposite directions, canceling out the observable effect.

As anticipated, the coefficients for gender and age are negative and significant. The substantive implications of these coefficients are apparent in Figures 2 and 3 (derived from Table 1, Model 3), which supply predicted probabilities.

Figure 2 – Probability of Reciprocation by Gender of Initiator




For male leaders, the probability of reciprocation is approximately .46, while the probability of reciprocation for female leaders is only .23. These differences are statistically significant. The large confidence interval for female leaders results from the small sample size and suggests that there have not yet been enough female heads of state to say something completely definitive about gender. That being said, these results suggest that female leaders that have held office had a statistically and substantively significant advantage when it came to dispute reciprocation.

With regard to Hypothesis 7, all else equal a leader who is 45 years old stands a 50% chance of having a dispute that he or she initiates reciprocated by the other side. At 75 years of age that probability declines to 40% (Figure 3). These results suggest that, consistent with the testosterone explanation for the relationship between age and

behavior identified by Horowitz et al. 2005), younger leaders may be more impetuous in the way they select potential adversaries making it more likely that their disputes will be reciprocated.

Figure 3 - Probability of Reciprocation by Age of Initiator



Among the remaining covariates, it is most notable that our models replicate Schultz’s core finding in support of democratic audience costs for the models that roughly adhere to his period of analysis (Models 2 and 4). As is generally found in this literature, contiguity and territorial disputes have a strong positive relationship with reciprocation. Political challenges, in contrast, have a negative and significant relationship with reciprocation.

Selection, Perception, or Both?

We now return to the issue raised above concerning the mechanism driving our findings, e.g. whether the experiences of the leader cause differences in the selection of adversaries, or whether it is the perceptions of the leader due to those experiences that leads to different responses from targets.

A definitive answer to this question is beyond our reach in part because these possibilities are, in fact, flipsides of the same coin, but it is possible to roughly identify the “riskiness” associated with initiating a militarized dispute. Specifically, the capability ratio between the initiator and the target could be indicative of the rashness of the initiation. If leaders with certain attributes are systematically targeting states with different capability ratios this would be telling information. While this framework is a simplification, we might expect that more risk-averse leaders, from a purely international perspective, will be more likely to select into militarized disputes where the material power ratio is in their favor. In contrast, more risk-acceptant leaders will select into disputes even when the capability ratio does not favor them.

To assess this possibility, Table 2 presents the mean proportion of total capability of the initiator for each of our leadership attribute variables. A higher mean indicates that the material balance of power was in favor of the initiator, e.g. the head of state with that particular background characteristic. We bold the differences that are statistically significant.

Table 2 - Capability Ratio by Leadership Attribute

	Mean	Standard Error
Age < 50	0.479	0.013
Age > 50	0.603	0.007
Female	0.645	0.059
Male	0.572	0.007
Rebel	0.526	0.010
No Rebel	0.602	0.009
Irregular	0.483	0.013
Regular	0.599	0.007
Combat	0.582	0.011
No Combat	0.565	0.008
Career	0.475	0.013
No Career	0.603	0.008

As anticipated, older leaders, non-rebels, those with regular entry into office, and those without career military experience are all substantially more conservative with regard to the power ratio between their nation and the states they confront. The finding for gender is in the expected direction, but the difference is insignificant probably due to the small number of female leaders in the sample. This suggests that the process of generating credibility, for these significant variables, is occurring primarily through the selectivity of certain classes of leaders who, in fact, bluff relatively rarely. While we cannot observe it, it would be reasonable to expect that these leaders are more successful when they do bluff.

Why, alternatively, is the combat variable not significant? This may point to the fact that it is the signaling aspect of prior combat experience that matters most in explaining the results in Table 1. Rather than causing leaders to become more hesitant about initiating militarized disputes and only selecting adversaries likely to back down, prior combat experience signals competence abroad, causing adversaries to interpret

the dispute initiation as especially credible and thus making them more likely to back down.

Compellent Threats

This far we have demonstrated the importance of leader attributes in the context of MID reciprocation, but our theoretical argument should also apply in the more limited sample of cases where a target is responding to a compellent threat (Downes and Sechser 2012). This provides a particularly stringent test given the small number of such threats and the fact that Downes and Sechser report a null finding for the relationship between a simple measure of democracy and threat response.

To explore this possibility, we shift our dataset to Sechser's (2012) compellent threat database, meaning the dependent variable is whether or not the target reciprocated a compellent threat or backed down. To aid comparisons, we employ Downes and Sechser's control variables, which closely resemble those employed in Table 1.¹⁴ The primary departure in these models is that we do not include the gender variable. The smaller number of compellent threats means that there are too few observations for female leaders, especially since we are then limited only to the 1918-2001 time period.

¹⁴ These are described in detail in Downes and Sechser (2012) and for the sake of space we do not repeat that discussion here. However, their control variables are similar to those employed by Schultz (2001).

Table 4 – Leadership Attributes and Compellent Threat Reciprocation


	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
	1918-2001	1945-2001	1918-2001	1945-2001
	$\beta/(SE)$	$\beta/(SE)$	$\beta/(SE)$	$\beta/(SE)$
Combat*Career			-2.358*	-19.220***
			(0.953)	(2.265)
Combat	-0.612	-1.462+	0.059	-0.011
	(0.386)	(0.842)	(0.487)	(1.255)
Career	0.465	1.898*	1.524+	18.661***
	(0.458)	(0.944)	(0.778)	(2.124)
Rebel	-0.018	0.322	0.071	0.058
	(0.412)	(0.698)	(0.425)	(0.803)
Irregular	-0.165	-1.263	-0.044	-1.053
	(0.488)	(0.827)	(0.500)	(0.883)
Age	0.000	0.058+	0.005	0.063+
	(0.016)	(0.032)	(0.017)	(0.034)
Democracy	0.392	-0.571	0.438	-0.253
	(0.466)	(0.803)	(0.468)	(0.845)
Major/Major	-0.498	-0.431	-0.753	-1.631
	(0.653)	(1.176)	(0.660)	(1.302)
Capability	1.292*	2.211*	0.971+	1.726+
	(0.585)	(0.956)	(0.587)	(0.935)
Contiguity	-0.047	-0.535	-0.089	-0.327
	(0.408)	(0.763)	(0.422)	(0.784)
Alliance Portfolio Similarity	0.163	1.511	0.133	1.577
	(0.575)	(1.147)	(0.589)	(1.094)
Status Quo Evaluation Initiator	0.024	1.151	0.020	0.676
	(0.544)	(1.216)	(0.554)	(1.384)
Status Quo Evaluation Target	-1.313*	-4.623**	-1.286*	-4.657**
	(0.582)	(1.584)	(0.592)	(1.752)
Territory	0.001	0.541	-0.120	0.587
	(0.383)	(0.723)	(0.373)	(0.766)
Government	-2.296***	-1.530	-2.560***	-2.893
	(0.658)	(1.721)	(0.620)	(2.367)
Policy	-0.302	-0.624	-0.301	-0.479
	(0.351)	(0.863)	(0.345)	(0.837)
Other	0.336	0.379	0.322	0.803
	(0.398)	(0.911)	(0.400)	(0.887)
N	233	117	233	117

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

The results demonstrate the robustness of our core finding concerning the relationship between career military service and combat experience when it comes to militarized dispute reciprocation. Figure 4 below (which is derived from Table 4, Model 11) shows a significant difference between leaders with military careers who have not

experienced combat, and those that have. The probability of compelling threat reciprocation decreases from 87% to 44% as you shift from a hypothetical leader who saw no combat but spent most of his career in the military, to a leader who saw combat and served as a career military officer.

Figure 4 - Probability of Compelling Threat Reciprocation



Conclusion

Leader attributes matter when it comes to generating and assessing credibility in the international system. Chief among these are the attributes most immediately connected to the conflict escalation – military and combat experience.

This is not to say that expectations of domestic political constraints on a potential adversary do not influence how a country calibrates its strategy or how adversaries judge their commitments. Domestic political constraints likely play an important role, just as Fearon (1994), Schultz (1998), and others (Weeks 2008) have identified. However, the personal attributes of leaders, and perceptions of those attributes, are also significant factors. Moreover, given that the personal characteristics of leaders are more directly observable than the nebulous ways in which a selectorate might place particular pressures on a leader, beliefs about a leader and how that leader might behave in a given instance are likely to be an equally powerful heuristic for guessing how a leader might behave in a militarized dispute.

The findings we present here open the door to additional work on this question. For example, the background experiences of the country on the receiving end of a militarized threat, Side B, are also likely to be relevant. For example, Gelpi and Grieco (2001) argue that younger political leaders and those with shorter tenures are more likely to attract military challenges than those with more experience and longer tenures. In addition, we have only scratched the surface when it comes to potentially relevant leader attributes. To take just one example, characterizing the extent and nature of a leader's prior government service may also be a useful way of informing expectations. Truman's prior service as Vice President, for example, may have shaped the perceptions of allies and adversaries alike when he took over from FDR at the end of World War II.

In a broader sense, this project is a step in the important ongoing process of incorporating leaders and their attributes into the systematic analysis of international

affairs. One consequence of the system-level theorizing that dominated international relations in past decades is that it pushed such domestic considerations into the background. As the findings in this paper demonstrate, with the gains from system level models largely consolidated, it is high time we brought such domestic considerations back into the fold.

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Appendix

Appendix Table 1 - Summary Statistics

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
<i>MID Models</i>					
Reciprocation	2660	0.4504	0.4976	0	1
Combat	2492	0.3431	0.4748	0	1
Career	2484	0.2484	0.4322	0	1
Rebel	2492	0.4077	0.4915	0	1
Irregular	2660	0.215	0.4109	0	1
Age	2493	57.699	12.368	19	92
Gender	2481	0.0117	0.1075	0	1
Democracy	2660	0.2102	0.4075	0	1
Major/Major	2660	0.0793	0.2703	0	1
Minor/Major	2660	0.1192	0.3241	0	1
Major/Minor	2660	0.2523	0.4344	0	1
Capability	2660	0.574	0.33	0.00028	0.9999
Contiguity	2660	0.6233	0.4846	0	1
Alliance	2623	0.1799	0.3842	0	1
Alliance Portfolio Similarity	2660	0.4497	1.1884	0	1
Status Quo Evaluation Initiator	2660	0.3734	1.1494	0	1
Status Quo Evaluation Target	2660	0.3789	1.1464	0	1
Territory	2660	0.2398	0.4271	0	1
Government	2660	0.0455	0.2084	0	1
Policy	2660	0.4402	0.4965	0	1
Other	2660	0.0289	0.1677	0	1
<i>Compellent Threat Models</i>					
Failure	242	0.6157	0.4874	0	1
Age	242	59.161	10.908	28	84
Rebel	242	0.3388	0.4743	0	1
Irregular	242	0.1942	0.3964	0	1
Combat	242	0.314	0.4651	0	1
Career	238	0.2059	0.4052	0	1
Democracy	242	0.3223	0.4683	0	1
Major/Major	242	0.0826	0.2759	0	1
Capability	242	0.6741	0.3086	0.00037	0.9998
Contiguity	242	0.6364	0.482	0	1
Alliance Portfolio Similarity	237	0.5763	0.3572	-0.5447	1
Status Quo Evaluation Initiator	242	0.1968	0.4159	-0.3625	1
Status Quo Evaluation Target	237	0.0553	0.3029	-0.3419	1
Territory	242	0.5909	0.4927	0	1
Government	242	0.1157	0.3205	0	1
Policy	242	0.4545	0.499	0	1
Other	242	0.2314	0.4226	0	1

Appendix Table 2 - Correlations of Key Independent Variables

	Career	Combat	Rebel	Irregular	Age	Gender
Career	1
Combat	0.5185	1
Rebel	0.1545	0.3799	1	.	.	.
Irregular	0.0414	0.3167	0.4456	1	.	.
Age	0.0044	-0.1072	0.0634	-0.0103	1	.
Gender	-0.0787	-0.0628	-0.0679	-0.0507	-0.0172	1

Violent Reciprocation

To further test the substantive importance of our findings, we shift the dependent variable from the reciprocation of any militarized dispute to violent reciprocation, meaning reciprocation that involved fatalities through the use of military force. This reflects the reality that all reciprocation is not equivalent. In particular, low-level, nonviolent reciprocation may be less influenced by variations in the initiating leader's credibility in part because it has a lesser chance of leading to uncontrolled escalation. Indeed, such tepid reciprocation may, in fact, represent a hedging strategy from a target state that believes the initiator is indeed credible, but is perhaps playing for time and information or seeking to minimize the costs from its own domestic audience that might follow immediate acquiescence.

In contrast, higher-level reciprocation, including the actual use of violence, is a clearer indication that the target is challenging the initiator's credibility. It may therefore be the case that violent reciprocation might drive any credibility-based effects for overall reciprocation (combining both low- and high-level types). To address this concern we change the dependent variable from all reciprocation to violent reciprocation in Table 3 below. The key findings from Table 1 remain intact with regard

to both substantive and statistical significance. To conserve space, we do not present the predicted probabilities for these models here because they so closely resemble those that accompanied Table 1.

Appendix Table 3 – Leadership Attributes and Violent Dispute Reciprocation

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	1869-2001	1945-2001	1869-2001	1945-2001
	β /(SE)	β /(SE)	β /(SE)	β /(SE)
Combat*Career			-0.426 (0.332)	-0.672 (0.465)
Combat	-0.226 (0.150)	-0.263 (0.201)	-0.128 (0.192)	-0.051 (0.340)
Career	0.340+ (0.185)	0.376 (0.245)	0.611** (0.206)	0.721** (0.242)
Rebel	0.308* (0.151)	0.370+ (0.208)	0.319+ (0.180)	0.406 (0.300)
Irregular	0.118 (0.167)	0.111 (0.199)	0.133 (0.158)	0.147 (0.200)
Age	-0.015** (0.005)	-0.022** (0.007)	-0.015** (0.006)	-0.023** (0.009)
Gender	-0.116 (0.470)	-0.257 (0.482)	-0.099 (0.436)	-0.210 (0.386)
Democracy	0.078 (0.238)	0.246 (0.345)	0.069 (0.265)	0.239 (0.387)
Major/Major	-0.097 (0.406)	10.614 (379.094)	-0.116 (0.349)	11.936*** (1.170)
Minor/Major	-0.272 (0.254)	-0.024 (0.340)	-0.267 (0.316)	-0.030 (0.392)
Major/Minor	0.033 (0.350)	10.793 (379.094)	0.003 (0.375)	12.095*** (1.161)
Capability	0.461+ (0.280)	0.609 (0.380)	0.469 (0.356)	0.629 (0.552)
Contiguity	0.714*** (0.144)	0.726*** (0.201)	0.710** (0.217)	0.693* (0.300)
Alliance	-0.012 (0.152)	-0.280 (0.215)	-0.022 (0.157)	-0.291 (0.208)
Alliance Portfolio Similarity	-0.070 (0.235)	0.076 (0.319)	-0.061 (0.478)	0.082 (0.495)
Status Quo Evaluation Initiator	0.686+ (0.358)	0.790 (0.646)	0.703+ (0.395)	0.847 (0.544)
Status Quo Evaluation Target	-0.377 (0.297)	-0.342 (0.402)	-0.388 (0.343)	-0.390 (0.391)
Territory	0.295* (0.144)	0.215 (0.188)	0.284* (0.144)	0.210 (0.189)
Government	0.834** (0.254)	0.490 (0.321)	0.837* (0.335)	0.486 (0.296)
Policy	-0.993*** (0.133)	-1.145*** (0.168)	-1.008*** (0.127)	-1.170*** (0.175)
Other	-1.167** (0.379)	-1.540*** (0.461)	-1.190** (0.433)	-1.573** (0.481)
N	2332	1450	2332	1450

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$